

THE DPJ AND ITS FACTIONS: BENEFIT OR THREAT?

CARMEN SCHMIDT*

Abstract

The Democratic Party of Japan's major victory at the 2009 Lower House election ended more than half a century of almost uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party. Based on former party affiliations, the DPJ is divided into eight factions, each headed by party heavyweights. Since no overall study has yet been done on the DPJ and its internal structure, we still have to ask whether the factions are motivated by ideological concerns or primarily driven by material concerns. The answer to this question has significant effects on the interpretation of the function of the factions as either integrative or divisive. By using surveys on policy positions of party members that were jointly conducted by the University of Tokyo and the newspaper *Asahi shinbun*, I asked for the policy diversification within the party and the factions. I found evidence that the policy diversification within the DPJ is wider than within other parties and that the factions are not mainly based on different policy positions. Therefore we have to reject the assertion that factionalism within the DPJ is primarily about policies. We also have to reject the assumption that the factions may act as an integrative mechanism within the party. We rather suggest that they are based on material (self-)interests. In the same manner as the LDP factions, the factions of the DPJ may become "parties within the party", posing a major threat to the unity of the party if factionalism within the DPJ is intensifying.

Contents

- I. Introduction
- II. The DPJ Factions: Strength, Composition and Leadership
 - 1. Faction Strength
 - 2. Social Structural Composition and Leadership
- III. Policy Diversification
 - 1. Policy Positions of Lower House Members in Comparison
 - 2. Policy Positions of DPJ Lawmakers
 - (1) Former party background and policy positions
 - (2) Factions and policy positions
- IV. Conclusion

* Professor for Political Sociology, and Speaker of the Japan Research Center, University of Osnabrueck (Germany). I am deeply indebted to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, which granted a Bridge-Fellowship between March and May 2010 to support my studies on the DPJ at the Graduate School of Social Science of Hitotsubashi University.

I. *Introduction*

Factionalism has been a persistent field of research in Japanese politics. With respect to the causes of factionalism, the distinction most frequently made is between materially motivated factions and ideologically motivated factions. Sartori for example (1976: 76-77) distinguishes between factions from interest and factions from principle, even though ideology may camouflage the true material interests of a faction. Whether a faction is based on ideological or on material interests has significant effects on its role within the party. Most theorists point at the negative role of the factions, since their fight with each other undermines the party unity. Especially materially-motivated factions are divisive, since their members are driven by self-interest, but differences in ideology may also lead to the creation of new parties if a faction consistently loses battles over the basic direction of the party. However, factionalism is not necessarily disintegrative. Some have observed that ideologically motivated factions may act as an integrative mechanism in catch-all parties by successfully integrating a diversity of internal interests, including organized interests, among the party membership (McAllister 1991: 207). Organized factions thus may permit a political party to broaden its political appeal to win votes and provide an integrative function in parties that are divided on social-structural or ideological lines (Belloni/ Beller 1978).

Within the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which has governed the nation for most of the past 50 years, factions have been extremely powerful. The ultimate aim of a faction is to have its leader elected party president and prime minister. Therefore, faction leaders have done everything in their power to maintain and expand their groups. Most notably they have financed the election campaigns of followers and arranged for key members of their factions to obtain cabinet and party positions, which has led to a rigid system of seniority appointment to important positions. Accordingly, factionalism within the LDP is not primarily about policies but on materialistic self-interest and, with very few exceptions, factions have avoided a particular policy colouring.¹ In the 1990s, LDP factionalism proved to be highly disruptive for the party. The ongoing political scandals in which the LDP elite had been involved since the late 1980s led to an acute crisis in 1993, which resulted in the party splitting and a temporary loss of power.

Owing to the LDP dominating the government, factionalism in Japan means LDP factionalism. However, the character and role of factions within Japanese parties differ markedly. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Clean Government Party or Kômeitô have imposed strict internal discipline to prevent factionalism, while factionalism within the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the largest opposition party until the mid-1990s, was rooted in ideological differences, specifically between the Marxists and social democrats.² Consequently, the JSP's factions could be ranked on a spectrum from left to right. After the formation of the party in 1955, the ideological strife between the factions resulted in the defection of the party's right wing. This led to the founding of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) during the early 1960s

¹ Only the former Miki faction was regarded as somewhat reform oriented and liberal. As for the LDP factions see Watanabe 1959: 173, Curtis 1988: 88, Tomita et al. 1992: 255, Fukui 1970: 134.

² During the 1990s, the party had replaced its Marxist program, adopted a modernized platform and changed its name to "Social Democratic Party of Japan" (SDPJ).

as well as to the secession of the centre-left faction and the creation of the Social Democratic League (SDL) during the 1970s, which both can be seen as examples for the disintegrative power of ideologically motivated factions (Stockwin 2000: 213-220).

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which emerged as the largest opposition party after the restructuring of the party system in the mid-1990s and became ruling party after the 2009 House of Representatives election, is also divided into several factions, each headed by a senior faction leader. In comparison to the LDP factions, the DPJ factions have to date been called “loose” factions; quite recently, however, there has been an intensifying of the party factionalism (Itagaki 2008). Since no overall study has yet been done on the DPJ and its internal structure, we still have to ask whether the factions are based on principle, either social-structural or ideological, or primarily driven by material concerns. The answer to this question has significant effects on the interpretation of the function of the factions as either integrative or divisive.

I start off by examining the factions, their composition, and their leaders on the basis of the faction members’ biographical and career data to investigate whether factionalism is based on distinctive social-structural characteristics. Subsequently, I focus on factionalism and ideological diversification with regard to policy positions. By means of surveys of party members’ policy positions, I ascertain the ideological distribution within the party and the factions. Finally, I try to answer the initial question on the function of the DPJ factions within the DPJ.

II. *The DPJ Factions: Strength, Composition and Leadership*

1. **Faction Strength**

In 2009, the DPJ consisted of eight factions and one group of independents. Unlike factional affiliations within the LDP, those within the DPJ are not published in order to avoid harm to the party.³ After the 2009 HR election many newly elected members joined the Diet, for which reason at the moment we have only estimations of political observers and the mass media about the actual strength, esp. with regard to the post-election figures. Table 1 summarizes the pre-election figures and the various estimations after the 2009 election.⁴ According to the pre-2009 figures, the Ozawa faction as the strongest one had 42 members in both Houses, while the smallest faction of Noda Yoshihiko only had a mere seven. The percentage difference between the strongest faction of Ozawa Ichirô and the next strongest faction of Hata Tsutomu, however, amounted to only five percent.

The pre-election figures do not indicate a one-faction-dominant structure. Rather, it resembled a factional alliances structure, and it is quite obvious that no faction could have carried its point alone. However, after the 2009 HR election the structure of the factions shifted clearly towards a one-faction-dominant structure. Many of the successful young candidates of

³ In his book “A Blueprint for a New Japan” (1994: 23), former party president Ozawa heavily criticized the LDP factions for posing a major threat to the unity of the party.

⁴ I am deeply indebted to Professor Meada Yukio from the Institute of Social Sciences of Tôkyô University for his help to compile the data.

TABLE 1. NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE DPJ FACTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2009 HR ELECTION

Faction	pre-2009 election* Itagaki (2008)		post-2009 election newspaper estimations*					
	N	%	Asahi	Yomiuri	Mainichi	Sankei	mean	mean %
Ozawa	42	18.9	150	150	100	120	130	33.7
Hata	31	14.0	20	-	15	-	18	4.5
Kawabata	27	12.2	30	35	30	20	29	7.4
Kan	26	11.7	30	60	40	40	43	11.0
Hatoyama	24	10.8	45	45	50	45	46	12.0
Yokomichi	24	10.8	30	25	30	25	28	7.1
Maehara/ Edano	18	8.1	30	60	40	30	40	10.4
Noda	7	3.2	35	40	30	30	34	8.7
Independents	23	10.4	-	-	20	-	20	5.2
N=	222	100	370	415	355	310	386	100

Note -: no figures. *Faction members in both houses.

Source: Itagaki 2008: 17-28, *Asahi shinbun* 03.09.2009, *Yomiuri shinbun* 15.09.2009 (<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/zoom/20090915-OYT9I00093.htm>), *Mainichi shinbun* 17.9.2009 (<http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/graph/minsyujinmyaku/index.html>), *Sankei shinbun* 31.8.2009 (<http://sankei.jp.msn.com/photos/politics/situation/090831stt0908312350012-p4.htm>).

the 2009 Lower House election attended the Ozawa School of Politics (see below) or received campaign funds from Ozawa. Therefore, the Ozawa faction grew significantly and was projected at 100 to 150 members, comprising roughly one-third of the DPJ lawmakers. The Hatoyama faction duplicated its membership and included 45 to 50 legislators in both houses with a share of approximately twelve percent. The Maehara and Noda factions too increased its membership whereas the Yokomichi, Kawabata and Hata factions' percentage decreased.⁵

2. Social Structural Composition and Leadership

To identify the criteria influencing DPJ factionalism, we refer to the list of faction members given in Itagaki 2008. We hereby limit the analysis to the Lower House faction members. Biographical data, such as age and gender, as well as career data such as length of service in the National Diet, local politics background, or a background within the national bureaucracy, the financial sector or NGOs were taken into consideration.⁶

Diet members, who inherited their political mandate from a father, a father-in-law or another close relative, were also important for recruitment in former times. This trend was predominant, though not exclusive, to the LDP (Ichikawa 1990). Even though descended from a political family did not constitute a major factor in respect of factionalism within the LDP, it was an important criterion for recruitment to a leading position within politics (Schmidt 2005: 55).

⁵ We should note that many members of the Maehara and Noda factions failed to win in the 2005 election but were successful in the 2009 election.

⁶ The biographical and career data of the faction members within both houses of the Japanese Diet were researched via the internet portal *JanJan* (<http://www.senkyo.janjan.jp/bin/search/diet.php>) and the information given in AERA (2009: 37-72).

Besides graduation from one of the “Big Five” universities (Tôdai, Kyôdai, Hitotsubashi, Waseda and Keiô), the Matsushita Institute of Government and Politics (*Matsushita seikei juku*) has recently become increasingly important for candidates’ recruitment and was therefore included in the sample as a variable. The Institute was established in 1979 by the founder of Matsushita Electric Industrial Corporation to “develop and promote leadership for the 21st century”.⁷ Overall, before the 2009 Lower House election, seventeen DPJ lawmakers attended the school, fourteen from the Lower House and three from the Upper House. Among the LDP Lower House members thirteen had graduated from the Institute (Itagaki 2008: 34-36).

The DPJ was an amalgam of politicians with a progressive or left-of-centre background and those with a conservative or right wing background from the beginning, even though the progressives’ influence decreased markedly over the time whereas the conservative ascendancy grew considerably (Itô 2008: 157-58).⁸ We assumed that the former party affiliation was an important factionalism criterion. Another criterion taken into consideration was a background as a labour union leader. The founding of the DPJ in 1996 was enforced by the co-operative labour federation Rengô, which had replaced the leftist Sôhyô at the end of the 1980s. It is maintained that the labour unions still back the DPJ.⁹

The largest faction within the DPJ before the 2009 election was the *Isshinkai* or Political Reform Group. The faction was headed by Ozawa Ichirô, a former LDP Minister of Home Affairs and Secretary General of the LDP as well as prominent member of the largest faction within the LDP, the Tanaka-Takeshita faction. Together with his followers, he seceded from the LDP in 1993 and founded several parties until he joined the DPJ in 2003. In April 2006, Ozawa became the president of the DPJ until his withdrawal in May 2009.¹⁰

The *Isshinkai* mainly consisted of former members of the LDP and the parties founded by Ozawa (see Table 2). Further, the faction embraced newly elected candidates with a personal relationship to Ozawa, such as his former secretaries or graduates from the Ozawa School of Politics (*Ozawa seiji juku*) among its members. This school was set up by Ozawa in 2001 as a summer school with the purpose of recruiting political personnel for the Liberal Party (LP, *Jiyûtô*). After the LP merger with the DPJ before the 2003 general election, the school became Ozawa’s private school, playing an increasingly important role in recruiting new candidates for the DPJ (Itagaki 2008: 175).

Before the 2009 HR election, about one-third of its members had a record of only one to four years in politics. Three other points should be mentioned: First, a comparatively high percentage had experience in local politics; second, the percentage of female members was much higher than the party’s average, third, a comparative high percentage had a high school

⁷ The school’s rather traditional and conservative orientation is reflected in its curriculum. The first year course, for instance, includes meditation for spiritual enlightenment, participation in tea ceremonies to learn the essence of Japanese traditional hospitality, as well as physical training to test the participants’ willpower and to develop a spirit of cooperation. See the homepage of the institute: http://www.mskj.or.jp/english/about_08.html

⁸ In Japan, the term “progressive” is generally taken as being the opposite of “conservative,” and refers to political attitudes of left-wingers, socialists, and those of a similar bent.

⁹ Rengô had called for the founding of a moderate social democratic party to establish a two-party system and increasingly refused to raise funds for the SDPJ (*Yomiuri shinbun* 13 Sept.1996).

¹⁰ Pressurized from within the party, Ozawa announced his resignation as party president on May 11, 2009, taking responsibility for the political fundraising scandal involving the chief accountant of his personal political fund management body, the *Rikuzankai*. Even though Ozawa stressed his innocence, he was finally forced to step down (see, e.g., *Japan Times*, March 21, 2009: “All eyes on Okubo as DPJ treads water.”)

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF DPJ MEMBERS' CHARACTERISTICS PER FACTION

Variables	Ozawa		Hata		Kawabata		Kan		Hatoyama		Yokomichi		Maehara		Noda		Independents		(re-)elected* 2009		all				
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%			
Former party affiliation**																									
LDP	6	33.3	3	15.0	0	0	0	0	3	23.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	20	0	0	16	8.0	29	9.4	
Shinseitō, LP	4	22.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	5.0	14	4.5	
JNP	0	0	1	5.0	0	0	1	8.3	3	23.1	0	0	2	12.5	2	40	0	0	0	0	9	4.5	18	5.8	
NFP	0	0	2	10.0	0	0	0	0	2	15.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	3.0	10	3.2	
Sakigake	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	31.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	3.5	12	3.9	
SPJ	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	16.7	1	7.7	7	77.8	1	6.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	3.5	18	5.8	
SDL	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.3	
DSP	1	5.6	0	0	3	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	2.5	9	2.9	
Others/ Ind.	3	16.7	3	15.0	0	0	1	8.3	1	7.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1.5	11	3.6	
DPJ	4	22.2	11	55.0	2	40	7	58.3	3	23.1	2	22.2	8	50	2	40	11	100	136	68.3	100	136	68.3	186	60.4
N=	18	100.0	20	100.0	5	100	12	100.0	13	100.0	9	100.0	16	100	5	100	5	100	11	100	199	100.0	308	100.0	
Age in 2009 (on average)	51.8	51.0	51.0	51.0	55.4	55.4	48.3	48.3	57.1	57.1	63.7	63.7	47.2	47.2	47.8	47.8	45.8	45.8	49.0	49.0	49.0	49.0	49.7	49.7	
-40	4	22.2	2	10.0	1	20.0	3	25.0	0	0	0	0	4	25.0	0	0	3	27.3	51	25.6	68	22.1	22.1		
40-49	4	22.2	7	35.0	1	20.0	5	41.7	2	15.4	0	0	8	50.0	3	60.0	4	36.4	61	30.7	95	30.8	30.8		
50-59	4	22.2	8	40.0	0	0	2	16.7	4	30.8	1	11.1	1	6.3	2	40.0	2	18.2	47	23.6	71	23.1	23.1		
60-69	5	27.8	1	5.0	3	60.0	2	16.7	7	53.8	7	77.8	3	18.8	0	0	2	18.2	34	17.1	64	20.8	20.8		
70+	1	5.6	2	10.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	3.0	10	3.2	3.2		
N=	18	100	20	100	5	100	12	100	13	100	9	100	16	100	5	100	11	100	199	100	199	100	308	100	
Years since first entering nat. politics (on average)	11.8	11.7	11.7	11.7	14.6	14.6	11.6	11.6	12.6	12.6	17.7	17.7	10.8	10.8	9.6	9.6	5.5	5.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	6.3	6.3	
1 to 4	5	27.8	2	10.0	0	0	1	8.3	1	7.7	2	22.2	2	12.5	1	20.0	2	18.2	140	70.4	156	50.6	50.6		
5 to 9	8	44.4	12	60.0	2	40.0	6	50.0	6	46.2	0	0	5	31.3	2	40.0	9	81.8	33	16.6	83	26.9	26.9		
10 to 19	4	22.2	4	20.0	2	40.0	4	33.3	5	38.5	6	66.7	9	56.3	2	40.0	0	0	0	0	22	11.1	58	18.8	
more than 20	1	5.6	2	10.0	1	20.0	1	8.3	1	7.7	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2.0	11	3.6	3.6		
N=	18	100	20	100	5	100	12	100	13	100	9	100	16	100	5	100	11	100	199	100	199	100	308	100	
Sex																									
male	14	77.8	19	95	5	100	11	91.7	13	100.0	8	88.9	14	87.5	5	100	11	100	168	84.4	268	87.4	268	87.0	
female	4	22.2	1	5	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	1	11.1	2	12.5	0	0	0	0	31	15.6	40	13.0	13.0		
N=	18	100	20	100	5	100	12	100	13	100	9	100	16	100	5	100	11	100	199	100	199	100	308	100	

Variables	Ozawa		Hata		Kawabata		Kan		Hatoyama		Yokomichi		Maehara		Noda		Independents		(re-)elected* 2009		all		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
School Background																							
Elite University***	11	61.1	11	55	3	60	6	50.0	6	46.2	4	44.4	8	50	5	100	7	63.64	91	45.7	152	49.4	
Others	5	27.8	9	45	1	20	6	50.0	7	53.8	4	44.4	8	50	0	0	4	36.4	100	50.3	144	46.8	
High school only	2	11.1	0	0	1	20	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	4.0	12	3.9	
N=	18	100	20	100	5	100	12	100	13	100	9	100	16	100	5	100	11	100	199	100	308	100	
Career Background***																							
Political family ¹	6	33.3	10	50.0	2	40	6	50.0	5	38.5	3	33.3	6	37.5	0	0	1	9.1	49	24.6	88	28.6	
MB ²	2	11.1	3	15.0	0	0	1	8.3	1	7.7	0	0	3	18.8	1	20	3	27.3	22	11.1	36	11.7	
Secretary ³	5	27.8	6	30.0	1	20	1	8.3	5	38.5	1	11.1	2	12.5	0	0	0	0	54	27.1	75	24.4	
Local politics ⁴	7	38.9	4	20.0	1	20	1	8.3	3	23.1	3	33.3	4	25	3	60	2	18.2	62	31.2	90	29.2	
Labour union ⁵	0	0	0	0	3	60	0	0.0	2	15.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	6.0	17	5.5	
Financial sector ⁶	1	5.6	4	20.0	0	0	3	25.0	1	7.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	11.1	31	10.1	
Foreign capital ⁷	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	3.5	8	2.6	
NGO ⁸	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	1	11.1	1	6.3	1	20	1	9.1	18	9.0	23	7.5	
Media ⁹	0	0	2	10.0	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	2	22.2	3	18.8	0	0	1	9.1	15	7.5	24	7.8	
MIGP ¹⁰	0	0	5	25.0	1	20	0	0	1	7.7	0	0	2	12.5	4	80	0	0	14	7.0	27	8.8	

Note: * Legislators (re-) elected in 2009; Newcomers N = 139; re-elected N = 60. ** Party affiliation at the time of the first national election/candidacy. *** Elite University = Todai, Kyodai, Hitotsubashi, Waseda, Keio. **** Career background: multiple mentions possible. ¹ Political family = descendants from a political family. ² MB = ministerial bureaucracy. ³ Secretary = secretary of a Diet member. ⁴ Local politics = member of a local assembly, incl. majors and governors. ⁵ Labour union: labour union official. ⁶ Financial sector = employment in the financial sector, incl. Bank of Japan. ⁷ Foreign capital = employment in a foreign investment capital corporation. ⁸ NGO = NGO official. ⁹ Media: Employed in the media sector, incl. newspapers. ¹⁰ MIGP = Matsushita Institute of Government and Politics.

Source: Own compilation

diploma only.

In the August 2009 Lower House election, the DPJ increased its seats significantly. Many of the winning candidates were women, most of whom were newcomers, who had been nominated as candidates with strong support from Ozawa, which is why they are called “Ozawa girls” (*Ozawa gâruzu*). Among 40 successful female candidates, 26 are regarded as “Ozawa girls” and expected to join his faction (AERA 2009: 82-84). Eight of these winning candidates had experience in local politics, six were former secretaries of a Diet member, four held a leading position within a NGO, and three came from the mass media. Only one of these candidates respectively was a former ministerial bureaucrat or a former labour union leader. Those candidates were comparatively young with an average of 44.7 years. Consequently, the faction was strengthened considerably and further rejuvenated.

The next largest faction was the *Seiken senryaku kenkyūkai* or the Political Strategy Study Group. The faction leader was former Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu, who also was a prominent member of the LDP Tanaka-Takeshita faction. The group led by Hata comprised many veteran conservatives who, together with Hata, defected from the LDP in 1993. Nearly one-third of its members were former LDP or members of the New Frontier Party (NFP, *Shinshintō*). The faction therefore comprised many older members, of whom 10 percent were older than 70 years. Conversely, we find only few younger members. With regard to the other variables, it is significant that half of the group’s members can be classified as descendants from a political family in either national or local politics, and one-third had been secretary of a Diet member. Further, we find some alumni from the Matsushita Institute of Government and Politics, as well as some lawmakers who came from the financial sector.

The *Minsha kyōkai* or the Democratic Socialist Society was led by Kawabata Tatsuo, who had served as labour union leader after entering Toray Company. As a member of the DSP, which had split off from JSP at the beginning of the 1960s as a result of the labour movement’s split into a left and a moderate labour federation, he was for the first time elected to the Lower House in 1986.¹¹ Many members of the *Minsha kyōkai* were from the former DSP with connections to the former moderate labour federation Dōmei. Overall 60 percent were former labour union activists. Senior politicians were numerous within this faction, which is why its members were comparatively old. However, we also found two younger members, one of whom was a former labour union activist at Toyota Motor Corp. Since the party is still firmly rooted in the labour unions of the private sector, the faction is able to attract younger candidates to run in elections (Itō (2008: 176). With regard to education, we find a comparatively high number of graduates from one of the elite universities and likewise persons with high school diploma only.

The fourth largest faction was the *Kuni no katachi kenkyūkai* or Study Group for a New Japan.¹² The faction leader was Kan Naoto. Kan was actively engaged in civil movements in the 1970s. Through a grassroots environmental campaign, he won a Lower House seat in 1980 as an SDL member. In September 1996, together with Hatoyama Yukio and Hokkaidō

¹¹ In 1954, a group of private sector unions had defected from the major union federation Sōhyō (General Council of Japanese Trade Unions), and formed the All-Japan Trade Union Congress (*Zenrō*), which later became the Japan Labor Confederation (*Dōmei*). Dōmei had backed the DSP ever since its formation, while Sōhyō still backed the JSP. Both federations merged to form the labour federation Rengō in 1989.

¹² Literally, “kuni no katachi” means the form or shape of a country.

Governor Yokomichi Takahiro, he founded the DPJ. The vast majority of the faction members had made their political debut as DPJ members and had no other party history. Accordingly, they were younger on average. Three members were from the former leftist parties JSP and SDL, and one was from Hosokawa's Japan New Party (JNP, *Nihonshintō*) that was found in 1992. With regard to the career background, a relative high number are descendants from a political family and nearly 20 percent came from large scale enterprises. Even though none of them had a union leader background, it is said that the faction depends on labour unions and is supported by many citizen groups (Itagaki 2008: 23). According to Tokoi (2009: 35) the faction is more loosely organized than other factions.

Seiken kōtai o jitsugen suru kai or the Group for Realizing Regime Change was headed by former LDP-member Hatoyama Yukio, who together with Kan and Yokomichi founded the DPJ in 1996. The faction's composition was rather heterogeneous and comprised former LDP parliamentarians, politicians from the JNP and some from the NFP. The others came from minor parties (including one from the Kōmeitō) or were independents. With regard to the other variables, nothing special stands out; however, it is noteworthy that the members were comparatively old on average and some members were descendants from a political family; further we find some secretaries of a Diet member.

The *Shinseikyoku kondankai* or the Group Discussing the New Political Situation was led by Yokomichi Takahiro,¹³ who had been elected to the first of his five terms in the House of Representatives in 1969 as a member of the JSP which had strong relations with the former leftist labour federation Sōhyō.¹⁴ In 1983, he left the House and was elected governor of Hokkaidō, serving for three terms until 1995. After resigning as governor, he left the JSP and founded the DPJ together with Kan and Hatoyama. Roughly 80 percent of the Yokomichi faction members were from the former JSP, the other faction members had no other party background. The faction included many experienced politicians and its members were the oldest on average. It is to note that many of its members have graduated from high school only.¹⁵

The *Ryōunkai*, literally the "Society above the clouds," was jointly led by Maehara Seiji and Edano Yukio. Maehara, a graduate from the Matsushita Institute of Government and Politics, entered the world of politics in 1991, winning an election to the Kyōto Prefectural Assembly. In 1993, he was elected to the House of Representatives as a member of Hosokawa's JNP. In 1994, he left the party and later that year joined the Sakigake party. In 1996, he became a member of the Democratic Party. Edano Yukio was elected to the Lower House for the first time in 1993, also as a member of the JNP. In 1994, together with Maehara, he left the party and joined the Sakigake. In 1996 he participated in the formation of the DPJ.

The faction was outspoken in its opposition of Ozawa (Itagaki 2008: 26). This could be clearly observed during the scandal involving Ozawa's secretary, when Maehara urged Ozawa to step down quickly.¹⁶ The faction had many young members — nearly 80 percent were

¹³ After the 2009 election Yokomichi was appointed Speaker of the House of Representatives. Commonly, the speaker temporarily lays down his party membership to guarantee neutrality of Diet affairs, for which reason Upper House member Koshiishi Azuma took over the faction's leadership. Koshiishi has been a member of the Japanese Teacher's Union (*Nikkyōsō*) and later assumed a leadership position in the labour federation Sōhyō.

¹⁴ Even though no one of the faction's Lower House members had a labour union background it should be taken into consideration that eight of the faction's fifteen Upper House members were former labour union activists.

¹⁵ Among the Lower House members two persons came from the mass media. However, this does not seem to be an outstanding feature of the faction, since no faction member in the Upper House had such a career background.

younger than 49 years. Many members had connections to the JNP and the former Sakigake party. They labelled themselves as neo-conservatives; nevertheless, the group also included one leftist member from the former JSP.¹⁷ Beyond that, we find some graduates from the Matsushita Institute of Government and Politics, some former ministerial bureaucrats, some from the mass media and some descendants from a political family.

The *Kaseikai* is also said to be in opposition to Ozawa.¹⁸ The faction leader was Noda Yoshihiko, also a graduate from the Matsushita Institute of Government and Politics. As a native of Funabashi, Chiba, he had been elected to the assembly of the Chiba Prefecture for the first time in 1987. In 1993, he was elected to the Diet as a member of the now-defunct JNP. In 1996, he ran for the NFP in a single seat district, but failed to win it. He later joined the DPJ and was re-elected to the Lower House in 2000. Similar to the Maehara-Edano faction, the group consisted of younger members who candidly opposed Ozawa (Itagaki 2008: 27). Many members were former JNP allies. Further it is noteworthy that four of the members were graduates from the Matsushita Institute of Government and Politics and a comparatively high percentage, including Noda, were former local politicians. Further, we find one member from the ministerial bureaucracy. Attention should be paid to the fact that all its members have a diploma from the “Big Five” universities.

The group of Independents (*muhabatsu*) did not have a faction or group leader. The overwhelming majority of this group consisted of newly elected members with no other party background. All had a record of 10 years or less in national politics. The number of ex-ministerial bureaucrats is comparatively high, as well as the number of elite university graduates.

Based on these findings, we conclude that former party affiliation constitutes the core of the factional alignment, even though we find more and more newly elected candidates with no other party history. The factions with a high share of pre-1993 politicians comprised mostly elder persons with much experience in politics. Conversely, the factions with politicians from the new parties, such as the JNP, or with persons without any other party history, included members who were younger and had served in parliament for a shorter time. One exception is the Ozawa faction, which expanded greatly during the 2009 Lower House election, with many younger candidates winning a seat. Furthermore, union membership and the attendance of the same political training institutes, such as the Matsushita Institute or the Ozawa School of Politics, also played an important role in factional alliance. Most of the private sector labour union activists were concentrated in the Kawabata faction, who had more former right-wing

¹⁶ See, for example, *Asahi shinbun* May 12, 2009: “Ozawa steps down as Minshuto president.” The factional rivalry between the pro- and contra-Ozawa camps can be observed during the last presidential elections as well. Although DPJ members and supporters have the right to vote in presidential elections under the party rules, this has happened only very rarely in the past. In most cases, the voting was limited to Diet members in accordance with Art. 11/7 of the DPJ Party Regulations, and thus decided by the factions. For details on the elections see Tachibana 2008: 161.

¹⁷ Sengoku Yoshito, a former JSP member and State Minister in charge of the Administrative Reform Council in the first Hatoyama cabinet. It is also said that the faction had some connections to the labor union of JR Higashi Nihon, even though no faction member actually had a labor union background. See Itagaki 2008: 26.

¹⁸ The name originates from Communist China’s “Hundred Flowers Campaign,” also termed the “Hundred Flowers Movement,” which was active from 1956 to 1957. During this campaign, the Chinese Communist Party encouraged a variety of views and solutions to national policy issues, launched under the slogan: “Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend.” The idea was that all people should voice their opinions about the issues of the day from different and opposing angles. See Spence 1990: 539–43.

socialists, while graduates from the Matsushita Institute were prominent, especially within the Noda, Maehara, and Hata factions.

It is remarkable that persons which held a leading position within a NGO were hardly found among the faction members. Overall their number within the DPJ is not very high; only 7.5% of the DPJ legislators in October 2009 had such a background. Among the faction members only organized labour was a found to be an important feature. These findings are consistent with the analysis of Hamamoto (2010: 17) who found that the proportion of interest groups that endorsed the LDP for the 2004 Upper House election was four times greater than those that endorsed the DPJ, which was merely supported by the labour organizations.¹⁹ However, if we take into consideration that around 15 percent of the “Ozawa girls” came from NGOs, such a background may become a future characteristic of the Ozawa faction.

Descendants of a political family were found in many factions. As a tendency their number is lowest among the factions with younger party members as well as within the Yokomichi faction. Ex-ministerial bureaucrats were especially found in the Maehara and Noda factions and among the group of independents. Those members also tended to have an elite university background. Further it is significant that the factions with a high percentage of young lawmakers, such as the Maehara-Edano and Noda factions, can be designated as anti-Ozawa, which in the past constituted a generational split within the party.

According to Tokoi (2009: 36), we can divide the factions in two major camps: (1) ordinary folks, who worked their way up into national politics, such as local politicians, secretaries, or labour unionists, who are supportive for Ozawa (the Kawabata, Yokomichi, Hata and Hatoyama factions) and (2) the “elitists”, embracing those originating from the ministerial bureaucracy or other elite sectors and the Matsushita Institute, who are fiercely opposing Ozawa (the Noda, Maehara and Kan factions and the group of independents). The social-structural analysis largely supports this assumption even though the Noda faction too includes many local politicians. With regard to education, however, such a split is obvious.

III. *Policy Diversification*

1. **Policy Positions of Lower House Members in Comparison**

The differences in party background may result in different policy positions; consequently, it might be informative to investigate the diffusion of party policies within the DPJ. We hereby at first look at the major policy differences of the parties in Japan to give an overview on controversial issues within the party system and to determine the position of the DPJ within the political spectrum before focusing on the distribution of policy positions within the DPJ. The investigation of policy positions is based on the 2009 survey of the candidates for the House of the Representatives election, which was jointly conducted by the University of Tokyo and the newspaper *Asahi shinbun*.²⁰ Besides issues of the day, the survey had questioned the

¹⁹ However, he also found that the relationships between the interest groups and the parties were affected by the parties' strength. Therefore it is likely that the DPJ's share of interest groups' endorsements will increase as a result of the power shift in 2009.

²⁰ The data were downloaded from: <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atsindex.html>

candidates' policy positions on a wide range of issues.

Former studies using joint surveys of candidates' policy positions discovered that responses to policy positions could be divided into three categories: (1) issues on which there was broad agreement among the candidates regardless of party, (2) issues on which there was some agreement, though less than in the previous category, and (3) issues on which opinions diverged widely between the parties. In former studies, there was broad agreement on support for improving social welfare, policies to improve the position of women and on the need for administrative reform as well as on opposition to the emperor having more say in the country's politics and to nuclear weapons. More variation was found with regard to policies that would achieve small government. In 1998, the Liberals, which later merged with the DPJ, were most strongly in favour for small government, followed by the LDP, while DPJ, Kômeitô, SDPJ, and JCP were more negative. Policy positions that showed a wide variation between the parties included the strengthening of Japan's Self Defence Forces (SDF), its international role, and the revision of the constitution. Besides the now defunct Liberal Party, the Liberal Democrats were the most strongly in favour of these policies, while both the Socialists and the Communist Party fiercely opposed these positions. DPJ and Kômeitô legislators had intermediate views, though they leant toward the opposition (Kabashima/ Steel 2006).²¹ This largely applied to the 2009 survey as well.²² However, we also found some attitudes that highly correlated with the economical development. To cope with the global financial crisis, the Japanese government too introduced emergency supplementary budgets. This policy measure was backed by all parties and support for small government shrunk considerably. In the 2005 survey, 50 percent of the LDP candidates showed support for small government; in 2009 this share has fallen to a mere 5.8 percent. Among the DPJ candidates support for small government fell from 16 percent to 3 percent. Thus, the parties' attitudes towards small government converged considerably.

As can be seen in Table 3 which summarizes the parties' policy positions on a number of issues polled in the main section of the survey (Q9_1 to Q9_20), the mean difference between the conservatives and progressives showed the highest values with regard to the revision of the constitution (*constitu*), the strengthening of Japan's defensive strength (*defence*), participation in the UN's peacekeeping operations (*peacekeep*), use of the right of collective self defence (*collecti*), a tough stance towards North Korea (*nkorea*), the abolition of the death penalty (*deathpen*), and the granting of local voting rights to foreign residents (*foreign*).

The revision of the constitution and the role of Japan's Self Defence Forces had been controversial between the progressives and conservatives since the 1950s. The revision is primarily aimed at changing Article 9 of the constitution, which prevents Japan from having armed forces, which is why the leftist JCP and JSP parties considered the SDF as unconstitutional. Since the late 1990s, Article 9 had been the central issue of a dispute about Japan's ability to undertake multilateral military commitments overseas. The LDP had proposed a revision — fiercely opposed by the leftist parties — that would resolve the discord between the SDF and Article 9. The JCP argued that the article allowed the renunciation of war and prohibited anything that constituted a military potential for war, and the leftist parties fiercely opposed SDF's participation in peacekeeping operations too. However, due to international pressure during the first Gulf War in 1992 to send troops instead of making financial

²¹ For an analysis of the 2003 survey, see Taniguchi 2006a, 2006b.

²² Of course, the questionnaire partly varies from survey to survey.

contributions, the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted in 1992 and enabled Japan to send not only its civilian personnel but also its SDF personnel to UN peacekeeping operations.²³ Non-surprisingly therefore the leftist parties fiercely opposed these policy issues. This is reflected by the mean which is close to 5 (*disagree strongly*). The majority of LDP candidates backed these policies, while the Kōmeitō and DPJ candidates were somewhat in the middle between these positions. The same can be said with regard to a tough stance against North Korea in bilateral relations.

In the area of human rights protection, political commentators have taken particular notice of the appointment of Upper House member Keiko Chiba, a former JSP member, as Justice Minister in the first Hatoyama cabinet, who opposes capital punishment and belongs to the non-partisan Parliamentary League for the Abolition of the Death Penalty.²⁴ This policy issue was highly controversial between the parties as well. The Social Democratic Party's members as well as the JCP members are staunchly in favour for the abolition of capital punishment, which is reflected by the mean which is close to 1 (*agree strongly*) whereas the overwhelming majority of the LDP Diet members opposed the abolition. Many DPJ members take a critical stance towards the abolition of the death penalty which is highlighted by the mean of 3.3.²⁵

Another highly controversial issue was the granting of local voting rights for permanent foreign residents. Since long the DPJ has backed the idea of political rights to foreigners. In 1998 and 2000, the party submitted bills to the Diet to give permanent residents — many of whom are of Korean origin — voting rights, but the bills subsequently died. The move got a boost after Prime Minister Hatoyama revealed in South Korea in October 2009 that his team will consider submitting a bill to grant voting rights, although some DPJ members opposed this legislation (*Japan Times* 16. Jan. 2010). Setting the bill in motion is in line with the DPJ's idea that Japan should play a prominent role in the East Asian community. Even though a foreigner suffrage bill could threaten the DPJ's relationship with its coalition partner People's New Party which opposes the bill, it can be seen as an opportunity to drive a wedge between the LDP and its former coalition partner Kōmeitō, which is clearly supportive of granting voting rights to foreign residents.

Overall, the standard deviation was wider within the DPJ members than within the other parties' Diet members. Kabashima and Steel (2006) argue that such an ideological breadth allows the party the flexibility of possibly allying itself with not just the SDPJ but also with the Kōmeitō and the JCP, although we could view this diversity as a threat to the party unity. Since the difference in means between the DPJ and the LDP was smaller in the majority of policy fields than between the DPJ and the SDPJ, we observe that the DPJ Diet members in this survey leant towards the LDP. Only within six policy fields (30%) the mean difference was smaller between the DPJ and SDPJ legislators.²⁶

²³ Even though JSP and JCP strongly opposed the PKO law when it was introduced in 1991, the DSP was supportive and the bill was finally passed with the cooperation of the Kōmeitō and the DSP (Ishikawa 2004: 173).

²⁴ The league is headed by Shizuka Kamei, leader of the People's New Party (*Kokuminshintō*), which together with the SDPJ formed a coalition with the DPJ after the 2009 election. However, the SDPJ left the coalition in May 2010 over the relocation issue of the US base in Futenma, Okinawa.

²⁵ Notably, the majority of the Japanese say that capital punishment is unavoidable. According to a government survey in early 2010, more than 85 percent of those polled are in favour of the death penalty. See *Japan Times* Feb. 7, 2010.

²⁶ Those were Q 9_11 to Q 9_16.

TABLE 3. POLICY POSITIONS OF LOWER HOUSE MEMBERS BY PARTY 2009

		LDP		Kōmeitō		DPJ		SDPJ		JCP		LDP-SDPJ Mean Diff.
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Q9_1	constitu	1,32	0,618	2,11	0,937	2,69	1,172	5,00	0,000	5,00	0,000	-3,68
9_2	defence	1,98	0,853	3,37	1,165	3,14	1,070	5,00	0,000	5,00	0,000	-3,02
9_3	nonnuclear	1,72	0,909	1,00	0,000	1,39	0,709	1,00	0,000	1,00	0,000	0,72
9_4	attac	2,64	0,965	4,05	1,079	3,51	1,091	5,00	0,000	5,00	0,000	-2,36
9_5	un	1,32	0,575	1,58	0,838	1,78	0,922	2,86	1,069	2,88	1,246	-1,53
9_6	nkorea	2,02	0,782	2,74	0,933	2,63	1,007	4,71	0,488	3,63	1,506	-2,70
9_7	collecti	1,93	0,798	4,53	0,697	3,43	1,161	5,00	0,000	5,00	0,000	-3,07
9_8	peacekeep	1,97	0,814	2,78	1,060	2,71	1,031	4,86	0,378	5,00	0,000	-2,88
9_9	smallgov	3,88	0,814	4,33	0,767	4,15	0,812	4,86	0,378	5,00	0,000	-0,97
9_10	lifetime	2,47	0,807	2,84	0,765	2,44	0,811	1,57	0,787	1,75	0,886	0,90
9_11	publicen	2,06	0,856	2,17	0,707	3,09	0,975	2,43	1,134	2,43	0,787	-0,37
9_12	keynes	1,56	0,698	1,84	0,765	2,63	0,935	2,57	0,787	2,38	0,518	-1,01
9_13	roadcons	2,18	0,974	2,68	0,946	4,07	0,927	4,57	0,787	4,75	0,463	-2,39
9_14	constax	2,28	0,884	2,47	0,697	3,79	1,045	4,71	0,488	5,00	0,000	-2,44
9_15	usetax	3,32	1,198	4,26	0,933	1,49	0,795	2,57	1,813	2,25	1,488	0,74
9_16	foreign	3,74	0,970	1,26	0,452	2,19	1,156	1,14	0,378	1,00	0,000	2,60
9_17	immigrant	2,95	0,898	2,21	0,855	2,84	0,886	2,29	1,113	3,13	0,354	0,67
9_18	safety	2,59	0,791	3,26	0,991	3,46	0,900	5,00	0,000	4,88	0,354	-2,41
9_19	educ	2,84	0,599	3,53	0,612	3,26	0,835	4,57	0,535	4,75	0,707	-1,74
9_20	deathpen	4,21	0,818	2,84	1,344	3,28	1,163	1,00	0,000	1,63	1,061	3,21
	Valid N=	95		18		272		7		6		

Note: The pollees were asked to rate their own positions on the given policy issues using a five-point scale ranging from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly), while 3 represented "Do not know". In statistics, standard deviation is a measure of the variability or dispersion of a data set, or a probability distribution. A low standard deviation indicates that the data tend to be very close to the same value (the mean), while high standard deviation indicates that the data are distributed over a large range of values. For the variables (Q9_1 to Q 9_20 see 2009 survey codebook: http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/2009ates_codebook.doc). Mean Diff.: Mean difference between the LDP and SDPJ legislators.

Source: Own compilation.

2. Policy Positions of DPJ Lawmakers

(1) Former party background and policy positions

Since the DPJ is an amalgam of politicians with a progressive or left-of-centre background and those with a conservative or right wing background, it might be informative first to investigate into former party affiliation and policy positions. We assume that policy positions on which opinions diverged widely between the parties will show wide variation within the DPJ too. After the 2009 HR election, a record number of new candidates without prior party history joined the DPJ. Thus, special emphasis is paid to variations that are found between those with and those without a prior party affiliation.

In order to investigate into policy variations we use the statistical method of analysis of variance (ANOVA), which provides a statistical test of whether or not the means of several groups are all equal, and therefore generalizes Student's two-sample t-test to more than two groups. If the different groups within the DPJ were primarily groups to further particular policies, we would expect the analysis of variance to identify them with a high degree of

TABLE 4. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA) Q1_1 TO Q1-20 BY FORMER PARTY MEMBERSHIP (significant cases only)

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Q9_1 constitu	Between Groups	26.829	6	4.472	3.485	.002
	Within Groups	328.441	256	1.283		
	Total	355.270	262			
Q9_2 defence	Between Groups	26.276	6	4.379	4.264	.000
	Within Groups	262.941	256	1.027		
	Total	289.217	262			
Q9_6 nkorea	Between Groups	13.152	6	2.192	2.219	.042
	Within Groups	251.932	255	.988		
	Total	265.084	261			
Q9_7 collecti	Between Groups	24.317	6	4.053	3.246	.004
	Within Groups	313.424	251	1.249		
	Total	337.740	257			
Q9_8 peacekeep	Between Groups	18.878	6	3.146	3.124	.006
	Within Groups	258.815	257	1.007		
	Total	277.693	263			
Q9_18 safety	Between Groups	17.757	6	2.959	3.754	.001
	Within Groups	204.202	259	.788		
	Total	221.959	265			
Q9_19 educ	Between Groups	13.467	6	2.244	3.474	.003
	Within Groups	164.747	255	.646		
	Total	178.214	261			

Note: Threshold F sig. = 2.135; sig. level = .05.

Source: Own estimation.

accuracy. Table 4 summarizes the policy issues that showed significant variation with regard to former party affiliation. With the exception of Q 9_18 (support for retrenchment of privacy to guarantee law and order, *safety*) and Q9_19 (support for traditional education, *educ*), the policy positions were congruent with those that showed significant variation between the parties.

Since a significant F statistic does not tell us where the differences may lie, a post-hoc analysis was performed for those variables that showed significant deviation to understand the nature of the variances. A summary of the multiple comparison on basis of the Tukey test, which reports the differences between every possible pair of factor levels and tests whether each is significant, shows that significant variation is found only between the former JSP-members and the others, including those without former party affiliation (see Table 5). While the former JSP-members staunchly oppose a revision of the constitution, the strengthening of the defensive strength, the use of the right of collective self-defence and the SDF's participation in peacekeeping operations, the former conservatives support such policy positions or take a middle-off-the road-position. Remarkably, those without prior party background have significantly different attitudes on the revision of the constitution, the strengthening of Japan's defence strength, the use of the right of collective self-defence, retrenchment of privacy and education when compared to the DPJ lawmakers who were originating from the JSP.

Besides we observe that the policy differences between the former DSP and JSP members were in almost all cases bigger than between the former JSP and LDP-members. Thus, it seems that the old cleavage between the JSP and the DSP, which had split from the JSP in the 1960s over differences on the alliances and defence issues and which was almost as conservative as

TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT POST-HOC TESTS (TUKEY) BY FORMER PARTY AFFILIATION

Dependent Variable	(I) Former party affiliation	(J) Former party affiliation	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Upper Bound	Lower Bound
Q9_1 constitu	Ex-JSP	DPJ only	.908 [*]	.288	.029	.05	1.76
		Ex-LDP	1.314 [*]	.359	.006	.25	2.38
		Ex-DSP	1.536 [*]	.467	.019	.15	2.92
		Ex-JNP	1.412 [*]	.389	.006	.26	2.57
		Ex-LP	.747	.451	.647	-.59	2.09
Q9_2 defence	Ex-JSP	DPJ only	1.114 [*]	.251	.000	.37	1.86
		Ex-LDP	1.056 [*]	.316	.017	.12	1.99
		Ex-DSP	1.556 [*]	.414	.004	.33	2.79
		Ex-JNP	1.458 [*]	.343	.001	.44	2.48
		Ex-LP	1.333 [*]	.414	.024	.10	2.56
Q9_6 nkorea	Ex-JSP	Ex-DSP	1.229 [*]	.410	.046	.01	2.45
Q9_7 collecti	Ex-JSP	DPJ only	.925 [*]	.284	.022	.08	1.77
		Ex-DSP	1.797 [*]	.461	.002	.43	3.17
		Ex-JNP	1.228 [*]	.389	.029	.07	2.38
Q9_8 peacekeep	Ex-JSP	Ex-LDP	1.004 [*]	.310	.023	.08	1.93
		Ex-DSP	1.556 [*]	.410	.003	.34	2.77
Q9_18 safety	Ex-JSP	DPJ only	.976 [*]	.220	.000	.32	1.63
		Ex-LDP	1.029 [*]	.274	.004	.21	1.84
		Ex-DSP	1.278 [*]	.362	.009	.20	2.35
		Ex-NFP	1.089 [*]	.350	.034	.05	2.13
		Ex-JNP	1.036 [*]	.300	.012	.14	1.93
Q9_19 educ	Ex-JSP	DPJ only	.744 [*]	.199	.004	.15	1.34
		Ex-LDP	1.042 [*]	.251	.001	.30	1.79
		Ex-LDP	1.111 [*]	.328	.014	.14	2.09

Note: * The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

DPJ only: DPJ lawmakers without prior party affiliation.

Source: Own estimation.

the LDP on security matters, is still pronounced within the DPJ.

(2) Factions and policy positions

The analysis of variance of policy position within the DPJ factions (Table 6) showed evidence for significant deviation between at least two factions with regard to support for revision of the constitution (*constitu*), the strengthening of Japan's defence capacity (*defence*), support for collective self defence (*collecti*), a pre-emptive strike in case of an attack (*attac*), support for small government (*smallgov*), support for retrenchment of privacy to guarantee law and order (*safety*) and support for traditional vs. individualistic education (*educ*). Non-surprisingly, these policy fields were predominantly those which were controversial between the parties and between the DPJ legislators with a conservative or progressive background.

The outcome of the post-hoc test is shown in Table 7. Since the Tukey test for Q9_7 and Q9_9 found no significant deviation, we found only five cases (20%) that varied between the factions. With respect to the vast majority of the policy positions, no significant variation was

TABLE 6. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA) Q1_1 TO Q1-20 BY FORMER FACTION (significant cases only)

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Q9_1 constitu	Between Groups	33.660	8	4.207	3.282	.002
	Within Groups	125.630	98	1.282		
	Total	159.290	106			
Q9_2 defence	Between Groups	27.254	8	3.407	3.183	.003
	Within Groups	103.803	97	1.070		
	Total	131.057	105			
Q9_4 attac	Between Groups	27.653	8	3.457	3.395	.002
	Within Groups	97.737	96	1.018		
	Total	125.390	104			
Q9_7 collecti	Between Groups	24.526	8	3.066	2.383	.022
	Within Groups	120.930	94	1.286		
	Total	145.456	102			
Q9_9 smallgov	Between Groups	9.893	8	1.237	2.298	.027
	Within Groups	51.669	96	.538		
	Total	61.562	104			
Q9_18 safety	Between Groups	23.981	8	2.998	4.084	.000
	Within Groups	71.925	98	.734		
	Total	95.907	106			
Q9_19 educ	Between Groups	12.531	8	1.566	2.736	.009
	Within Groups	54.383	95	.572		
	Total	66.913	103			

Note: Threshold F sig.= 2.03; sig.level =.05.

Source: Own estimation.

found between the factions. With regard to the other cases, significant deviation was found only between the Yokomichi faction and, in changing composition, the other factions. The Yokomichi faction opposes the revision of the constitution, the strengthening of the SDF, a pre-emptive military strike in case of an attack, the retrenchment of privacy to guarantee law and order and a traditional education, whereas the other factions tend to support these policy issues or take a middle-off-the road position.

Two more points stand out: First, we neither found significant differences between the Kan and the Yokomichi faction nor between the Kan faction and the other factions. This means that the Kan factions' positions on those policy issues are somewhere between those of the Yokomichi faction and the other groups. Following Tokoi (2010: 34) we can classify the policy attitudes of this faction as "liberal". Second, we find significant variation between the Yokomichi faction (ex-JSP) and the Kawabata faction (ex-DSP) with regard to strengthening Japan's defensive strength, a pre-emptive strike and retrenchment of privacy. Overall this mirrors the findings of section III 2.(1). Based on those findings we can safely conclude that only the Yokomichi faction with a high share of former JSP members can be seen as a policy based faction that differs significantly from the other factions, and the split occurs predominantly between this faction and the more conservative oriented other factions which do not show a specific policy colouring and are not significantly different from each other. With regard to the pro- and contra Ozawa coalitions (see section II.2.) it seems that the camps are not primarily based on shared policy positions since the pro-Ozawa camp comprises the Ozawa, Hata, Hatoyama, Kawabata and Yokomichi factions whereas the anti-Ozawa-camp includes the

TABLE 7. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT POST-HOC TESTS (Tukey) BETWEEN THE FACTIONS

Dependent Variable	(I) Faction	(J) Faction	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Upper Bound	Lower Bound
Q9_1 constitu	Yokomichi	Hata	1.637(*)	.458	.015	.18	3.09
		Hatoyama	2.111(*)	.491	.001	.55	3.67
		Maehara	1.674(*)	.472	.017	.18	3.17
		Independents	2.111(*)	.509	.002	.50	3.73
Q9_2 defence	Yokomichi	Ozawa	1.431(*)	.431	.033	.06	2.80
		Hata	1.713(*)	.419	.003	.39	3.04
		Kawabata	1.956(*)	.577	.027	.12	3.79
		Maehara	1.681(*)	.431	.005	.31	3.05
		Noda	1.956(*)	.577	.027	.12	3.79
		Independents	1.919(*)	.465	.002	.44	3.39
		Ozawa	1.542(*)	.416	.010	.22	2.86
Q9_4 attac	Yokomichi	Hata	1.556(*)	.412	.008	.25	2.86
		Kawabata	2.178(*)	.563	.006	.39	3.96
		Maehara	1.715(*)	.420	.003	.38	3.05
		Independents	1.596(*)	.454	.018	.16	3.04
Q9_18 safety	Yokomichi	Ozawa	1.255(*)	.353	.016	.13	2.38
		Hata	1.509(*)	.347	.001	.41	2.61
		Kawabata	1.867(*)	.478	.005	.35	3.38
		Hatoyama	1.282(*)	.371	.022	.10	2.46
		Maehara	1.604(*)	.357	.001	.47	2.74
		Independents	1.667(*)	.385	.001	.45	2.89
Q9_19 educ	Yokomichi	Hata	1.167(*)	.309	.008	.19	2.15

Note: * The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

For Q9_7 (collecti) and Q_9 (smallgov) no significant variations were found when performing the Tukey test. Only when testing with LSD, there is some evidence for significant variations. However, LSD is the most liberal post-hoc test, while Bonferoni is the least liberal. The other commonly uses tests, SNK and Tukey, are between the most and least liberal. The more liberal a test is, the more likely it will find significance between the mean, but the more likely it is that this difference is actually just due to chance.

Source: Own estimation.

Maehara, Noda and Kan factions and the group of independents.

IV. Conclusion

In the past the DPJ factions were regarded as more or less loose groups rather than factions and it was argued that the party was not as factionalized as the LDP, which has traditionally placed high priority on intra-party factional alignment. This investigation has tried to discover more about the nature of DPJ factionalism by analyzing the faction members' composition and their policy opinions.

The DPJ is divided into eight factions, headed by well-known veteran politicians and party heavyweights who act as a magnet for like-minded lawmakers. Former party affiliation constitutes the core of DPJ factionalism, even though many DPJ members, especially the

younger ones, have had no other party affiliations before entering politics. Other social structural variables or career background were not found to be of great influence. Nevertheless, the same political training background, such as the Matsushita Institute, and connections to the labour unions proved to be significant. However, labour seems to be the only organized interests found to be a core factor of DPJ factionalism that could translate into different policy positions.

In the past, no faction succeeded in dominating the party, and factional alliances were necessary to achieve a certain goal. As a result of the 2009 Lower House election, however, the Ozawa faction could boost its membership significantly and meanwhile outnumbers the other groups by far. Thus, the relationship between the factions has changed from a factional alliances structure to a one-faction-dominant one.

The investigation of policy positions found evidence that the policy diversification within the DPJ is wider than within other parties. This variation is due to the fact that the party was formed by a variety of existing political forces of diverse ideological background, which still seems to be of distinct importance for the diversity within the DPJ today. With regard to political issues, the analysis found evidence that the party is profoundly split over key policies such as the revision of the constitution. In this regard, the former JSP legislators adopt traditional leftist positions, while the former LDP or JNP Diet members tend in direction of traditional rightist positions. The party members without prior party background too tend to hold moderate-conservative attitudes. The analysis has proven that the former JSP members' positions are distinctly different from those of the other party members and the ideological divide occurs predominately between the former JSP legislators and the others. With regard to policies, the DPJ would convey a more homogeneous picture without the former JSP members. Further it is noteworthy that the policy cleavage between the former JSP legislators and those of the former DSP is most distinct, since they show the greatest distance from each other. This finding suggests that we do not find a moderate social-democratic element comprised by former DSP- and JSP members within the DPJ.

In view of the factions we found no evidence that they are based on different policy positions, with exception of the Yokomichi faction, comprising the former JSP-members. The analysis suggests that only the attitudes of this faction show a specific policy colouring, while the differences between the other factions were not significant. We therefore can view the Yokomichi faction members' position as an isolated one within the DPJ. Since the Yokomichi faction comprises only a minority of DPJ lawmakers and its share is on the wane, we might predict that its policy positions won't make their way into legislation. If the faction consistently loses the crucial battles over the basic party policies, its members might exercise the "exit" option and create a new party or movement to carry out their goals, even though there are hardly any good prospects for a new social-democratic party at the moment. If we take into consideration that organized labour is the largest DPJ supporter group among the interest groups in Japan, a breakaway of the party's left wing can have serious effects on future election results. The diminishing influence of former leftist politicians within the DPJ might also explain why the DPJ members' attitudes in this survey on the whole lean more towards the LDP than towards the opposition.

As to our initial question whether the DPJ factions are materially or ideologically motivated, we can reject the assertion that the factions are essentially ideological. Rather they have their roots in patronage and leaders, since factionalism within the DPJ is not primarily

about policies. Accordingly there is little support for the assumption that the factions may act as an integrative mechanism within the party by integrating a diversity of internal interests. We rather suggest that they are based on material (self-)interests. In the same manner as the LDP factions, the factions of the DPJ may become “parties within the party”, posing a major threat to the unity of the party if factionalism within the DPJ is intensifying.

REFERENCES

- AERA ed. 2009. *Minshutô ga wakaru* (Understanding the DPJ). Aera rinji zokan No. 49 (2009/10/25).
- Curtis, Gerald L. 1988. *The Japanese Way of Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Belloni, Frank P./ Dennis C. Beller. 1978. “The Study of Factions”. In: *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller. Santa Barbara: ABS CLIO: 3-18.
- Democratic Party of Japan, ed. 2007. *Minshutô kiyaku* (DPJ Party Regulations). <http://www.dpj.or.jp/governance/policy/index.html>.
- Fukui, Haruhiro (1970): *Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy-Making*. Berkeley und Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Hamamoto, Shinsuke. 2010. “Changes among Interest Groups toward the Two-Party System”. In: *Social Science Japan* 42: 16-20.
- Ichikawa, Taichi. 1990. *Seshû daigishi no kenkyû* (A Study on Second Generation Diet Members). Tôkyô: Nihon keizai shinbun sha.
- Itagaki, Eiken. 2008. *Minshutô habatsu kôsô shi* (History of DPJ's Factional Strife). Tôkyô: Kyôei shobô.
- Itô, Atsuo. 2008. *Minshutô: Yabô to yagô no mechanizumu* (The mechanism of ambitions and useful coalitions to achieve political power). Tôkyô: Shinchôsha.
- Kabashima, Ikuo and Gill Steel. 2006. “How the LDP survives”. In: *Japan Echo* 33/3 (<http://www.japanecho.co.jp/sum/2006/330303.html>).
- Ishikawa, Masumi. 2004. *Sengo seiji shi* (Japan's post-war political history). Tôkyô: Iwanami shinsho.
- McAllister, Ian (1991). “Party Adaptation and Factionalism within the Australian Party System”: In: *American Journal of Political Science* 35/1: 206-227.
- Ozawa, Ichirô. 1994. *Blueprint for A New Japan*. Translated by Louisa Rubinfiel. Tokyo, New York, London: Kodansha International. Original title: *Nihon kaizô keikaku*, Tokyo: Kodansha.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schmidt, Carmen. 2005. “Japan's Circle of Power: Legitimacy and Integration of a National Elite”. In: *ASIEN* 96: 46-67.
- Spence, Jonathan D. 1990: *The Search For Modern China*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Stockwin, J. A. A. 2000. “The Social Democratic Party (Formerly Socialist Party): A Turbulent Odyssey”. In: *Japan's New Party System*, ed. Ronald J. Hrebenar. Boulder: Westview Press: 209-251.
- Tachibana, Tamiyoshi, ed. 2008. *Minshutô jûnen shi* (10 years DPJ). Tôkyô: Daiichi shorin.

- Taniguchi, Masaki 2006a. “Shûgiin sôsenkyo kôhosha no seisaku ichi” (The policy position of candidates for the HR election). In: *Nenpô seiji gaku 2005 II*: 11-24.
- Taniguchi, Masaki 2006b. “Shûgiin giin no seisaku ichi” (The policy positions of HR members). In *Nihon seiji kenkyû* 3/ 1: pp. 90-108
- Tokoi Ken'ichi 2009. “Hachi shûdan no kessoku to zenbô” (Unity and whole picture of the eight groups). In: AERA ed. 2009. *Minshutô ga wakaru* (Understanding the DPJ). Aera rinji zokan No. 49 (2009/10/25): 34-36.
- Tomita, Nobuo, Akira Nakamura and Ronald J. Hrebendar. 1992. „The Liberal Democratic Party: The Ruling Party of Japan“. In: *The Japanese Party System*, ed. Ronald J. Hrebendar. Boulder: Westview Press: 237-284.
- Watanabe, Tsuneo 1959. *Habatsu: hoshutô no kaibô* (The Factions: An Analysis of the Conservative Party). Tôkyô: Kôbundô.